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Colombia has witnessed a renewed interest in merging and acquiring financial
institutions during 2003-2005. These have been “complementary mergers” that
seek to exploit economies scale and scope. This process contrasts favorably with
those mergers & acquisitions that occurred during the mid-1990s, which involved
mainly “twin institutions” that lacked potential for gaining multiproduct efficiency.
This document analyzes the need to remove some of the regulatory constraints
that obstruct further exploitation of such economies of scale-scope and quantifies
the “cost efficiencies” shown by the Colombian banking sector (1994-2005). At the
aggregate level, we found (absolute) banking efficiency to be around 63%, a
similar value to those found in related studies post-crisis.  This implies that banks
operating in Colombia have been able to recover their efficiency levels during post-
crisis 2003-2005, except for mortgage institutions. We highlight regulatory barriers
that could be removed to help the banking system move closer to the optimal
production frontier.
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Financial Development (O160).
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I.  Introduction
The Colombian financial sector has suffered from high volatility during the 1990-
2005 period, fulfilling a complete cycle of recovery-expansion-overgrowth-crisis-
recovery. During this cycle, those phases can be delineated as follows: redesign of
the financial system and recovery (1990-1993); credit expansion and merger &
acquisition frenzy (1994-1995); overgrowth and asset bubble, especially real estate
(1996-1997); crisis (1998-2002); and financial recovery, except for the mortgage
banking sector (2003-2005).
As will be shown, in terms of consolidation, there is a renewed interest in merging
and acquiring institutions that provide new synergies through diversified financial
markets. This process of consolidation contrasts favorably with what happened
during the 1994-1997 period, when the sector witnessed “twin mergers.” These
mergers  helped  to  diversify  the  loan  book  primarily  in  terms  of  region  and
population strata, but not by economic sector activity. Therefore, these mergers
extended the prevailing activity, while the “complementary mergers” of the 2003-
2005 period were able to expand and diversify the sources of the asset side of the
balance sheet.
It is worthwhile mentioning the transformation of the “corporaciones de ahorro y
vivienda” (CAV) from the 1972-1999 period into mortgage banks (BECH) from the
2000-2003 period. These banks already had foreign exchange operations and
consumer credit (along with mortgages). The ensuing absorption of the BECHs by
the commercial banks (2004-2005) has given rise to one of the most important
banking consolidation processes in the financial history of the country.  During this
last phase of mergers and acquisitions, the tendency has been towards institutional
arrangements where the majority of the commercial banks operates under a
system  which  provides,  “under  the  same  roof”,  mortgage,  commercial,  and
consumer  credit.  Furthermore,  it  supplies  credit  to  the  Small  and  Medium3
Enterprises (SME), with a renewed interest even for the micro-enterprise (now with
state guarantees).
On the deposit-taking and payment services areas, integration has been practically
completed. Even those that, for branding reasons, do not operate “under the same
roof”,  have  created  cross-institutional  networks  that  effectively  replicate  the
universal banking system, especially on the liability side.
Banking and securities supervision in Colombia has also moved forward in an
important way, with the merger, in December 2005, of both tasks under the new
unified Superintendencia Financiera. Encompassing banking-securities supervision
entails  demanding  organizational  challenges  and  new  data  requirements.  In
historical terms, the weakest link in supervision stemmed from the securities
markets, which were more focused on promotion than in surveillance. This bias
affected negatively the crucial tasks of supervision, valuation and regulation of the
securities and forex portfolios. The confidence-crisis of the public debt market
(TES) in August of 2002 alerted the authorities on the importance of overcoming
the supervisory deficiency in the securities market.
There has been extensive discussion regarding the “optimal-sequence” of the
financial reform: should be reformed first the structure of the banking system or the
regulatory institutions?   However, on the one hand, the recent creation of the
unified Superintendencia-Financiera is a fait accompli.  On the other hand, the
financial markets of Colombia have witnessed consolidation of quasi-universal
operations (except for fiduciary businesses, leasing, investment banking and
insurance). Therefore, what lies ahead is to examine the rationale behind these
banking mergers and acquisitions and the supervisory-regulatory tasks that these
process demands. In a similar vein, it will be crucial to examine constraints and
limitations  that  impair  further  exploitation  of  economies  of  scale-scope.  This
consolidated system, both in its regulatory and operational structures, should allow4
for the customer to have a larger “menu”, at a lower financial cost and representing
a lower systemic risk.
Colombia has lacked financial depth (both on assets and liabilities) in historical
terms. For example, the loan/GDP ratio was only 38.7% in 1997 (a peak historical
value) and the financial savings/GDP ratio was 43.2% in that same year. By end of
2005, the loan/GDP ratio had declined to 23% and the financial savings/GDP ratio
was down to 36.8%.  In spite of the significant recovery of the real sector during
2003-2005, growing at an average annual rate of 4.6%, the financial sector has
remained relatively stagnant.
There are several factors underlying this relative stagnation of the financial sector,
being financial repression one of the most important ones. This repression has
been induced by the Financial Transactions tax (ITF) and the judicial instability
produced by several decisions of the high courts (Anif 2005a).
This new phase of financial mergers and acquisitions still has to face a double
degree of uncertainty in the immediate future: the first one has to do with the
moment where the financial deepening synchronizes (again) with the economic
recovery cycle; the second one deals with the moment where these elements of
financial repression that still weigh on the sector are removed. If these obstacles
are  removed,  the  financial  sector  consolidation  and  the  unified  supervision-
regulation  will  allow  Colombia  to  properly  face  the  challenges  posed  by
globalization, including the Free Trade Agreement with the US (in the process of
ratification), Central America (being worked-out), and Europe.
The second part of this document deals with the institutional transformations of the
Colombian financial sector during 1990-2005. The third section presents the
econometric estimations of the cost efficiency in the Colombian financial sector,
covering quarterly information for 30 banks during 1994-2005. This estimation is
done following the stochastic frontier method, which takes a translog functional5
form for the cost function. At the aggregate level, the results show that this
efficiency is close to 63%, similar to the one found for the post-crisis period in other
studies. This shows that, once the financial sector crisis was overcome, banks
have been able to recover their efficiency levels.
II. Trends of the Colombian financial sector: 1990-2005
This section presents and overview of the Colombian financial structure, focused
on the banking sector, during the past fifteen years. First, we will deal with the
changes in structure, and later, we will analyze its performance at a quantitative
level, relative to the economic cycle.
A.  Structure of the financial sector
The  Colombian  financial  sector  went  from  being  a  highly  regulated  and
uncompetitive system in the eighties to one of greater freedom and efficiency,
based on subsidiaries, during the nineties. Currently, this set-up has advanced
towards a system of financial services provided “under the same roof.”   The
process  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  allowed  commercial  banks  to
“swallowed” mortgage institutions (BECH), consolidation financial services under
the aegis of commercial banks.
Barriers to banking integration
It is clear, however, that several barriers to financial services universalization
remain in place.  Such barriers can be identified in three areas. The first barriers
are legal. This is the case of leasing, the management of fiduciary (or trust-funds)
resources and insurance services.   All these services require, under current
legislation, specialized vehicles.   This specialization (a legacy of the subsidiary
system) has worked against market trends that call for further integration.6
A second type of obstacle results from “diffuse regulations”, which have been, in
effect, superseded by the market’s own practices. This has been the case of
investment banking, which has found mechanisms to offer its financial advisory
services through different alternative channels (frequently foreign firms). Hence,
investment banking offered through the Corporaciones Financieras (CF) has been
agonizing, remaining only two out of seven CFs.
The rationale for CFs services can be tracked-back to the 1960-1980 period, when
long-term intermediation vehicles were needed to help in the transformation of
maturities for long-term investment projects (Ortega, 1982), where multilaterals and
Central Bank’s played an important supporting-role. The sources of these loans
(multilateral  funding  and  expensive  CDs)  have  changed  in  favor  of  foreign
investment banks. Syndicate loans, bond advisory and structured credits now fulfill
this task through multi-faceted commercial bank, just like it has been happening
internationally  with  JPMorgan-Chase,  Citibank-SSB,  etc..  Moreover,  the
complementary advisory services in M&A and Project Finance have become truly
globalized, and the investment bank’s good-will often plays a fundamental role in
the selection process.
Finally, there are barriers related to market segmentations (Clavijo, 1984). This is
the  case  of  the  revitalization  of  the  (near-banks)  finance  companies  (called
Compañías de Financiamiento Comercial - CFCs), which were re-specialized in
providing leasing services during the 1990s.  Furthermore, CFCs are being used to
provide banking services that traditional banks are not willing to offer due to
concerns of money-laundry risks involved in the foreign exchange market tapped
by some CFCs.
The potential economies of scale-scope and its exploitation by the banking sector
needs to be re-examined under these new developments.   There is a need for
removing some of these barriers in order to promote further financial services
integration.   Lower regulatory and transactional costs should help in reducing7
production costs in the banking firm, so that customers received a wider menu at a
lower marginal cost.
B.  Evolution of the Colombian Financial System
Since 1923, the Colombian financial system was conceived as a multi-banking
system in which commercial banks managed diverse lending-saving operations in
an integrated fashion. However, as time went by, the system became fragmented
as a result of lacking market dynamics.  Additionally, a complex political economy
led the Central Bank to support specific economic sectors through subsidies loans.
Hence, the asset side of the banking system became rather specialized (coffee,
livestock, commerce, industrial, mortgage), while the liability side remained rather
“universal”  (Ortega,  1982;  Montenegro,  1983;  Hernández,  2000;  Urrutia  and
Caballero, 2005).  The financial system ended up operating under a hybrid system,
which consolidated during the 1970s and 1980s (Clavijo, 1992). On the asset side,
CFCs were created to specialize  in semi-durable  goods, and the real-estate
lending was performed almost exclusively by the CAVs.  On the liability side, there
were some steps towards universalization, especially when the CAVs were allowed
to offer inflation-indexed savings accounts and CDs and CFCs and Corporaciones
Financieras (CF) were allowed to gather deposits via CDs. However, even on the
liability side, the specialized structure remained: the monopoly on current accounts
was reserved for banks; inflation indexation for on-demand savings accounts was
limited to CAVs; special conditions for medium-term deposit gathering were given
to the CFs.
During  the  1990s,  deep  financial  reforms  were  undertaken  to  overcome  the
complex regulation and to give greater universality to the financial balance sheet,
both on its deposit taking as well as in its loans (Hommes y Montenegro, 1989). An
important flexibility on the active and passive interest rates was achieved; several
compulsory investments were eliminated, reduced the weighted average reserve8
requirements from a 25% to 5% and the requirements for entry and exit were
relaxed. Overall, financial repression was reduced (Salazar, 2005; Villar et. al
2005) from and index value of 24 in 1990 down to 10 in 2003. These reforms gave
way to a “universal” banking structure, where financial conglomerates, anchored on
a core bank, started providing most of the services through their affiliates, where
the laws 30 of 1990 and 45 of 1993 played a fundamental role. (Melo, 1993;
Martinez, 1994).
As mentioned, despite the advances toward multibanking, other specializations
structures were strengthened, especially between 1993 and 1997. (Urrutia, 1996;
Carrasquilla  y  Zarate,  1997).  While  CAVs  were  allowed  to  broaden  its  loan
operations towards consumer credit and FX operations, fiduciary operations, which
used to be a section within commercial banks, were compelled to establish entities
devoted to it. Likewise, regulation demanded CFCs to adopt specialized structures
in order to provide leasing services, furthering segmentation, contrary to the gains
obtained  in  the  rest  of  the  system.  The  adopted  structure  did  not  allow  the
complete use of several economies of scale and scope and the financial system
continued to be segmented, expensive, and inefficient (Clavijo, 2000).
The financial services diversification coincided with the credit boom period (1993-
1997). This led to an accelerated growth in the number of institutions, especially in
the consumer credit area, generating an excessive number of bank and CAV
branches as well as the offices dedicated to leasing and fiduciary business.
With the start of the crisis (1998-1999), those excess costs and rigidities were
made obvious. Although late, the system recognized that it was oversized and the
circumstances forced the system to a drastic reduction in the number of financial
institutions. Something like this had already occurred with the CFCs in 1995-1996,
but during the crisis, this wave of branch closings was throughout the sector.
CAVs were severely affected by the crisis and forced to recalculate their out9
standings for mortgage credits (by Law 510 of 1990).  CAVs were finally absorbed
by commercial banks in the early 2000s (Carrasquilla et. al 2000; Urrutia, 2000;
Cuéllar, 2002; Clavijo, et. al 2005).
The  total  number  of  institutions  supervised  by  the  Banking  Superintendence
(excluding the Central Bank, the exchange houses and the representation offices)
has been reduced from 438 in 1995 to 349 in 1999 (a downsize of 89 entities).
Similarly, the financial system’s total assets stagnated, remaining close to 55% of
GDP during 1997-1999.
As has been shown, there was a generalized expansion phase during the recovery
period (1990-1994) and credit boom (1995-1997), during which the CFCs took
advantage of the specialization signs to expand, while the CAVs over-expanded
during the entire 1993-1997 period. During the crisis (1998-2002), the system
rearranged itself by closing some institutions (mainly CFCs), merging some of
them (CAVs-BECHs). The process of consolidation around the commercial bank’s
expanded  operations  began  during  the  recent  recovery  phase  (2992-2005).
Simultaneously, the CFs have almost disappeared as specialized entities.
It is clear, therefore, that, despite the advances, signs of specialized banking
remain,  with  the  barriers  coming  from  regulation  already  discussed  (CFs-
fiduciaries-insurance), the ones induced by regulatory-fiscal (CFC-leasing) or by
frictions within the system (CFC-exchange houses), which might be draining the
capacity to fully exploit additional synergies within the banking sector. Graph II.1
shows the structure inherited from Law 510 of 1999 and the additional reforms by
Law 795 of 2003, where the central theme has been the absorption of the BECHs
by  commercial  banks,  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  the  appearance  of  a  better
regulatory framework for the financial cooperatives (based on Law 454 of 1998)
and the possibility of deposit taking by the cajas cofamiliares from their affiliates, in
order to feed their own financial institutions (according to Law 920 of 2004).10
The entire process of mergers and strategic alliances, especially the most recent
ones (2003-2005), makes relevant the debate about the best organizational form
that  the  Colombian  financial  system  must  adopt,  as  well  as  its  regulatory-
supervisory structure. Before answering which has to be this new structure, which
most likely will not deviate in any substantial form from the current tendencies, it is
important to first examine the state of the financial sector as a whole.
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C.  Recent performance of the financial sector
Recent changes to its structure
Chart 1 illustrates that the number of financial institutions in the boom period
reached 201 in 1995. During the crisis period it was reduced to 126 in 1999 and we
have estimated that by year-end 2005, there would only be 80 institutions. This11
implies a reduction of approximately 120 institutions (60%) during one decade,
signaling the rearrangement of the sector. Note that the bulk of the system works
around 18 properly consolidated commercial banks. The remnants are 1 BECH, 2
CFs and 25 CFCs (15 broad and 10 leasing, although this distinction has become
a mere formality). On the financial services institutions (non-intermediaries) today
there are six pension fund managers (AFPs) and 28 fiduciaries, all of them having
suffered significant reductions in numbers in the 1995-2005 period.
Chart 1
1995 1999 2004 2005 2006
Banks 32 26 21 19 17
CAVs-BECHs 10 5 7 1 1
CFs 24 10 4 2 2
CFCs 74 40 25 25 24
    General 31 21 15 15 15
    Leasing 43 19 10 10 9
Other entities 61 45 36 34 33
Pension Funds 14 8 6 6 6
Trust Funds 47 37 30 28 27
TOTAL 201 126 93 81 77
Sources: Superintendencia Financiera and Anif calculations
Number of financial institutions in Colombia
We have already explained the “structural” reasons behind these movements, so
we will only mention them here. The mergers and acquisitions on the BECHs-
commercial banks follow a “natural tendency” of a more efficient credit system
where the credit risk on home loan, which is high, has been extracted by the
securitization of this type of loan portfolio towards specialized vehicles for this
purpose. The “extinction” of CFs is the result of the combination between synergies
within the banks and the globalization of investment banking. The reduction in the
number of CFCs fulfilled its first cycle in the mid-eighties (basically by over-
expansion), which was basically slowed down by regulatory reasons dealing with12
leasing and saw a renewed strength by the exchange houses. Finally, fiduciary
business has kept certain operational specificities (agile in the specific mandates
and with appropriate separation of the resources assigned), but, in principle, there
does not seem to be a reason to believe that the same objectives could not be
achieved inside the commercial banks, just as it used to be before this service was
taken out of them in the early nineties.
Chart 2 shows that this merger process has represented an important change in
the loan book mix. Actually, the financial sector is currently undergoing one of its
most dynamic moments, and greater competition within it, with clear benefits for
the financial services consumer. For example, the weighted average interest rate
for all credits has fallen from a historical 15% in real terms at the end of the
nineties to close to 8% in real terms currently. This process has accentuated and
will continue to do so given the latest merger announcements that already affect
more than 50% of the banking assets. Institutions are looking for larger sizes to
multiply the services offered, at a lesser cost, and with a greater diversification of
credit risk.
Chart 2
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For example, the merged Bancolombia- Conavi-Corfinsura has a new loan book
that is 73% commercial, 15% consumer and 11% home loans.  The recent BBVA-
Granahorrar merger implies that the commercial loans will represent 59% of the
entire book, home 21%, and consumer credit 20%. The Davivienda-Superior bank
will  have  consumer  credit  representing  45%  of  total  book,  home  21%  and
commercial 28%.
However, as it will be analyzed further on, these mergers also end up generating
additional costs, and it is still to be seen if this market positioning by type of credit
is able to balance these new costs. For example, Bancolombia and Banco de
Occidente will become focused as “commercial” (with 10 and 11 percentage points,
above the market average, respectively); BBVA and Caja Social would become
focused on home loans (10 and 18 points ahead), while Davivienda and Sudameris
would potentially become geared towards consumer credit (21 and 11 points
ahead), (see chart 3).
Chart 3
% Assets Commercial Housing Consumer SMEs Focus
Bancolombia 20 -1 -17 -1 Commercial
Conavi 20
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Megabanco
% of assets affected 64 53 12 32 2 Average composition  (%)
Sources: Superintendencia Financiera and Anif Calculations
  New Loan Book composition (Deviation from average)14
The system’s structural reorganization has also generated an asset recomposition
of the financial intermediaries. This reshuffling privileged the assets of commercial
banks-BECHs, which, in 2005 represent 89% of the system’s total, up from 76% in
1995.   However, as a result from the crisis and the adoption of the Financial
Transaction Tax (ITF), these assets have lost importance in the macroeconomic
leverage, from 55% of GDP in 1995 to only 45% in 2005 (chart 4). As a matter of
fact, the establishment of the ITF has negatively affected financial intermediation
throughout all social levels, and, in the aggregate, has made access to credit more
expensive, especially for the weakest production units.  The ITF was created in
1998 during an economic emergency as a temporary contribution with differential
rates and its proceeds were destined to the improvement of the financial sector in
order to safeguard the deposits from the general public to avoid a systemic risk.
However, it has just completed eight years since its inception (Anif, 2005a).
Furthermore its duration was extended, and its rate increased from 0.3% to 0.4%
by Law 863 of 2003. This has exacerbated informality and distortions in the
financial services. The increase in the use of cash has probably caused that the
larger revenues due to ITF are compensated by the loss in revenues by income
taxes and VAT. It is now clear the fall in the ITF productivity (graph 2).
Chart 4
1995 1999 2004 2005 2006
Banks 28,5 35,8 27,2 38,9 44,2
CAVs-BECHs 13,3 10,3 12,4 1,3 1,4
CFs 6,9 6,3 3,4 2,0 2,0
CFCs 5,9 2,6 3,0 3,5 3,9
    General 3,3 1,4 1,1 1,2 1,2
    Leasing 2,7 1,2 1,9 2,3 2,6
Other entities 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6
Pension Funds 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3
Trust Funds 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
TOTAL 54,9 55,5 46,7 44,9 51,8
Sources: Superintendencia Financiera and Anif calculations
Financial System Indicators: Assets/ GDP15
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It has been discussed that this bundling of financial institutions and their loan
books could generate a larger market power, with potential risks stemming from
collusive oligopoly positions. It is clear, however, that the degree of banking
concentration is not directly related to the organizational structure of the banking
sector between multibanking or specialized banking (Anif, 2005b).  For example,
Germany  has  the  most  traditional  multibanking  system,  but  has  the  lowest
concentration index among the EU. Japan, with a specialized system, also shows a
low level. In Colombia, there was a dilution of banking assets in the mid-nineties,
when the Herfindahl Index fell from 0.103 in 1975 to 0.075 in 1996 as a result of
the dispersion of financial services (graph II.3). Between 1996 and 2005, there has
been a reversion of this process, and this index shows a return to moderate levels
of concentration (0.09). As will be shown later on, the mergers and the exploitation
of the economies of scale has allowed the average bank cost in Colombia to fall,
without generating an asset concentration that is worrisome at the current levels.
The current structure of the system has consolidated around commercial banks,
with greater diversification in its loan book and clear efficiency gains relative to
1995. Despite this, the multi-bank structure still seems to show obstacles arising
from different sources (regulatory, tax-induced o stigmatization). Comparing the16
structure under Law 510/1999 with the one under Law 795/2003, it can be noted
that the basic system is the same but with a reduction in the BECHs-CFs, and
eventually the CFCs. Up to a certain point, this structure could eventually permeate
the activity of the fiduciary institutions and the insurance system, depending on the
goal of the regulator.
Graph 3
Herfindahl Index-IHH: International Comparation
 (Respecto a los Activos Bancarios)
Sources: Asobancaria (Assets 1975 and 1996), Superintendencia Financiera and 


















































Summarizing, the analysis herein presented allows to arrive at two conclusions we
consider to be important:
i)  On the one hand, we have been able to contrast the “complementary”
nature of the most recent mergers (2004-2005), where the loan book
diversification has allowed further exploitation of additional synergies on
the asset side of the balance sheet, complementing the ones achieved
on the liability side during the previous M&A phase (1995-1999); and,
ii)  Although we have witnessed a banking consolidation with bigger and
more diversified institutions, the resulting degree of concentration is still17
within  a  moderate  range  that  should  not  threaten  the  competitive
structure that is currently observed in the Colombian banking sector.
III.  Efficiency and Effects of M&As in the Colombian banking sector
Over  the  past  15  years,  there  has  been  a  significant  wave  of  mergers  and
acquisitions in the banking industry worldwide. Over 10.000 firms were acquired by
others in the industrialized countries during the 1990s.   This phenomenon has
been the bank’s answer to the significant changes in regulation, the advancement
of technology and telecom, as well as the industry’s desire to improve its efficiency
levels. It is about pushing the banking frontier, with a greater population and
geographical coverage, while simultaneously offering a growing variety of banking
products (Van den Berghe et. al, 1999; Amel, et. al, 2002; IMF, 2004; IADB, 2004).
The goal of this section is to present the results of the econometric estimation
performed on the quarterly information for 30 Colombian banks in the 1994-2005
period. This estimation was done under the stochastic frontier approach that uses
a translogarithmic functional form for the cost function. Additionally, an analysis is
performed on how the efficiency of certain entities involved in merger processes
during this period changed.
A. Efficiency concepts and methodologies used in the literature
The notion of efficiency is a concept that encompasses several dimensions. One
the one hand, there are the concepts of efficiencies of scale and scope. As such, a
firm is efficient if it is operating at an optimal plant level (efficiency of scale) or
produces an optimal combination of products (efficiency of scope), for a given set
of prices of its input. The other concept is the X-efficiency, which refers to the
technical  efficiency,  where  a  firms  is  considered  to  be  efficient  in  costs  if  it
minimizes these given an production level and is efficient in benefit if it maximizes18
those for a given combination of input and output. In the latter, size and technology
are  given.  Therefore,  diverse  concepts  lead  to  different  forms  of  measuring
efficiency.
In the empirical  literature, there are several methods of estimating  technical
efficiency, which can be characterized as parametric and non-parametric methods.
The main characteristic of the former is the assumption of a functional form for the
cost  (or  benefit)  function,  either  Cobb  Douglas,  Translog  o  Fourier  Flexible,
establishing a relationship between amounts and prices of input and output.
Simultaneously, different methodologies can be used to estimate the cost frontier:
i) stochastic frontier, SFA, ii) de “thick” frontier, and iii) distribution free approach,
DFA.
Under the first approach, firms that appear to be more efficient, as measured by
their historical indicators, are separated from those that are less so. In this case,
the cost frontier of the more efficient group of banks is assumed to be the optimal
one.  The  difference  between  the  costs  of  each  bank  in  the  group  of  lower
achievement relative to the “optimal” frontier reflects its inefficiency level.
The stochastic frontier approach econometrically estimates a cost (or benefit)
function for all the banks. The regression errors capture the firm’s inefficiency and
the purely random shocks. The error decomposition into these two components is
what allows us to obtain an efficiency measure for each firm.
The DFA approach does assumes that the entire error captures the inefficiency of
the firm, and therefore, does not decompose the random term. In other words,
assumes that the random error has a zero mean in the period under study. The
efficiency measure obtained is relative, as it is measured relative to the bank that
obtains the lowest level of inefficiency.19
Finally, the non-parametric methods do specify a functional form for the cost or
benefit function but rather build this frontier based on observed points (cost, output)
for the firms in the sample. These methods use linear programming. Among the
non-parametric  methods,  the  most  widely  used  are  the  “Data  Envelopment
Analysis”, DEA and “Free Disposal Hull”.
B. Literature Review on banking efficiency and mergers
1.  International Review
There are multiple studies in the international literature that have estimated the
efficiency for several countries en regions. Therefore, making a comprehensive
review is beyond the scope of this study; as a matter of fact, several studies have
already taken on this task. We will use those to make a brief summary on that
debate.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) analyzed 130 case studies from 21 countries where
estimates of efficiency for the banking sector had been made and inquired on the
consistency of the results. They found that, on average, the efficiency of the
financial institutions is around 77%, although the variation in the results is relatively
high; the standard deviations of those results was close to 13 percentage point. On
the other hand, for same within-country cases, there was a high variation in results.
Their revision suggests that part of these differences is due to methodological
differences, related to sample and study periods. However, the dispersion of the
results and the impossibility to achieve a consensus also led them to suggest
improvements to the methods, with the goal of achieving more precise, consistent
and useful efficiency measurements.
The US has been the country where the production of studies on banking efficiency
has  been  more  prodigal.  Berger  and  Mester  (1997)  review  the  literature  on
efficiency in the commercial banks and try to provide more evidence using 6.00020
pieces of commercial bank data for US banks that operated continuously between
1990 and 1995.  They tried to find if the discrepancies in the results were due to
issues such as: i) differences in the concept of efficiency used by the analysts, ii)
differences in the methodology used to measure efficiency, and iii) elements that
can be correlated with the efficiency but that are not taken into account, or are not
controlled by them in the estimations. With respect to the concepts of efficiency,
the authors examine efficiencies in cost, standard benefits and alternative benefits.
They find that each one of the efficiency concepts adds information (independently)
and that the cost efficiency does not appear to be related to the efficiency in
benefits. However, both measures do appear to keep a relationship with the bank
performance, measured through other indicators. Similarly, the variables that are
correlated with efficiency, but that are not included in the estimation, have different
relationship with the three measures of efficiency.
On the topic of efficiency and consolidation, Amel et al (2002) make a detailed
review of the empirical literature worldwide. The authors review several works that
measure the efficiency after the mergers in the financial systems in developer
countries  over  the  past  twenty  years  in  order  to  find  common  patterns  that
transcend national and sector specificities of each country. The authors find that,
although efficiency gains have been observed in the previous 10 years, the effects
of  the  mergers  in  the  performance  of  the  institutions  involved  are  not  fully
understood.  Their  review  suggests  that  the  gains  derived  from  the  use  of
economies of scale and scope have been less than what is commonly believed.
Furthermore, the gains in efficiency that result from better administrative practices
are not clear for the large and complex institutions. Overall, there seems to be a
consensus around the fact that the mergers in the financial sector provide benefits
only up to a certain firm size, as they allow reaching economies of scale. Another
conclusion that has also been reached is that it is difficult to extract robot lessons
on the exploitation of economies of scope given the multi-product studies are
scarce due to lack of data or measurement problems. Finally, their review shows21
that there is no evidence of a systematic reduction in administrative costs due to
mergers.
These results, however, might respond to several issues. In many countries,
mergers took place under a rather regulated environment. For example, in the US,
the strict regulation on branches and geographic expansion that remained until not
long ago might have avoided that the efficiency gains were fully exploited. Second,
the selection of the control group, against which gains in efficiency are evaluated,
might obscure the results; furthermore, in some cases, such group has effects on
the mergers themselves. Finally, it is possible that the merger effects become
materialized over long period of time, which suggest that the gains of recent
mergers might be under-estimated.
2.  Review of some studies for Colombia
There  are  several  studies  that  have  taken  on  the  topic  of  efficiency  in  the
Colombian banks. This section, instead of pursuing the methodological detail of
each of those works, will focus on summarizing the main results derived from the.
Additionally, we will emphasize the studies that evaluate the effect of mergers on
the efficiency of the sector, highlighting those referring to the Colombian case.
1
During the eighties, most of the studies for the Colombian case revolved around
the estimation of economies of scale, trying to evaluate the impact of the increase
in the units of product on the costs of the bank. That was reach through the
estimation of a cost function that depended on the product level. The first studies,
such as the one by Bernal and Herrera (1983), estimated a Cobb-Douglas cost
function, whose ease lied on the linearity of its logarithmic form, which eased the
estimation of the cost elasticity to changes in the banking product, deriving from
them the economies of scale. One of the biggest critique to that study was that the
                                                   
1  Specifically, we will not summarize the results of works such as Badel (2002) and
Mora (2002) whose goal was to make an international comparison on efficiency.22
results (elasticity of production costs to product less than 1, between 0.88 and
0.93, for the 1976-1981 period) implied a negative slope for the average cost
curve. This suggested that the economies of scale were never ending and that,
therefore, an optimal production scale did not exist, as cost savings would always
occur  by  marginally  increasing  the  product  level.  Additionally,  the  degree  of
economies of scale was constant, independent from the product level, as this type
of cost functions did not allow to adjust U-shaped unitary cost functions (Suescún,
1987).
This  limitation  of  the  work  by  Bernal  and  Herrera  led  to  the  use  of  another
functional form for the cost function. Suescún (1987) and Ferrufino (1991) tried to
correct the previous exercises using translog functional forms, which are more
flexible when modeling costs. Additionally, they considered other banking products
different from the loan book (number of asset and liability accounts). The results
obtained suggest that the commercial banks at the time had increasing returns to
scale, with average scale economies of 0,71. This percentage was reduced when
the organization’s costs were considered as a whole; that is, the greater costs
generated by the expansion of the operation based on the widening of the branch
network (0.83). An additional result indicated that, if the average size of the
account doubled, costs only increased by 43%. Finally, the marginal cost of jointly
producing a service was reduced in about 30% relative to the individual production.
Ferrufino (1991) extended the analysis by Suescún (1987) to the CAVs and the
CFs, finding very similar results. However, both works found that economies of
scale were non-exhaustible, which made impossible to find the optimal firm size.
Another limitation of the previous works was that they assumed that all the banks
were located in the efficient cost frontier (i.e. are equally efficient) and, therefore,
any deviation relative to such frontier was a random error. This implied that the
gains in efficiency were only due to the exploitation of economies of scale. Trying
to correct these failures, Suescún and Misas (1996) studied other aspects of bank
efficiency: i) economies of scale; ii) technological change; and iii) X-inefficiency,23
that, as has already been explained, refers to the ability firms have to control their
costs relative to the ideal situation, that is, relative to the least possible use of
inputs to generate the same amount of product. They used the “thick frontier”
approach (TFA), from where the relative behavior of the financial intermediaries
that  operate  under  the  same  financial  regime  is  compared.  Similarly,  they
performed the econometric exercises on a sample of 22 banks for the 1989-1995
(half-year data).
The authors find that, in effect, Colombian banks are inefficient, overall due to the
X-inefficiency, and not as much as the lack of economies of scale. Effectively, total
inefficiency equates to 30.8% of the total operational costs of commercial banks, of
which 85% can be explained by the x-inefficiency (27% of total costs). According to
these results, the inefficiencies arise from the differences in administrative abilities
of each bank to control costs. From this it can be inferred that if all banks operated
at efficient levels (one which minimizes averages cost), the operational costs of the
sector would only be reduced by 3 or 4%.
One of the main criticisms to the work by Suescún and Misas was that they did not
include the cost of financing in the cost structure of the banks. This omission is
problematic, as the financing costs represent close to 66% of total expenses, and
this would be underestimating the degree of real inefficiency of the financial system
(Janna, 2004).
Castro (2001) addressed the X-efficiency of the Colombian banking sector through
the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) for the period 1994-1999.   He used the
financial intermediary approach, where deposits, capital and labor were used as
inputs, while loans and portfolio investments performed as outputs of the firm.
Costs related to operational factors (including interest payments).
2  He found that
                                                   
2  This  approach  differs  from  the  approach  on  production  where  banks  are
considered to be firms that use capital and labor to produce deposits and loans. In
this  approach,  the  product  is  measured  as the number  of asset and  liability
accounts  ant  the  only  relevant  costs  are  the  operational  ones.  The  large24
the banking structure helped in explaining costs variance across firms-efficiency,
where  public  banks  were  less  efficient  that  private  ones  and  no  significant
differences were found between local and foreign banks.
Janna (2002) also used the intermediation approach, but decided for a one-step
translogarithmic function which makes hard to interpret those results. He estimated
the efficiency-cost of the banking system (28 firms over the period 1992-2002).  His
SFA-approached  focused  on  the  absolute  efficiency,  instead  of  the  relative
efficiency, finding an average value of 34%, where higher inefficiency seems to be
correlate with the conditions of being a local bank and preferences for lending to
individuals rather than firms.
Estrada and Osorio (2004) used a similar approach, but including financial capital
in order to test as well for efficiency in benefits (not only in costs).  Efficiency in
costs, of about 50% for the system, showed higher variance than in benefits.
Finally, Estrada (2005) studied the effect of M&A on cost-efficiency and market
prices for the 1994-2004 period.   He found that M&A not only promotes higher
efficiency for the banking system as a whole, but that gains were more pronounced
in the case of the firms that were less efficient before the merged.
C. Estimating Cost-Efficiency in Colombia (1994-2005)
1. Methodology
We will follow the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) to estimate the X-efficiency of
the Colombian banking during 1994-2005, similar to the one used by Castro
(2001).
                                                                                                                                                               
disadvantage from this approximation is that it does not consider interest cost,
which represents an important part of the total costs of the banks. Additionally the
empirical estimation requires information that is not always easy to obtain.25
We shall focus on commercial and mortgage banks, which represent about 80% of
financial  intermediary’s  assets’,  including  30  firms.   We  aim  at  finding  both
aggregate efficiency for the system and temporal (or individual) firm efficiencies.
Under the intermediation approach, we shall use labor, capital and deposits as
inputs, while loans and portfolio investments stand as outputs.   Our cost function
deals then with operational costs (including interest payments).
We shall estimate and stochastic-production frontier (SFA) in order to compute the
firm’s deviation with respect to that optimal frontier.   The cost function can be
written as:
( ) T t y N i w y Ln c Ln it it it it ,..., 2 , 1 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = + = ε
where cit is total cost of bank i at moment t; yit  is the output vector;  wit is the inputs
vector and εit is the error term.  This error term depicts the difference with respect
to the efficient frontier, such that:
it it it µ ν ε + =
Hence,  under  the  SFA,  the  error  can  be  decomposed  between  a  random
component uit and the inefficiency component vit. As usual, we shall assume that uit
follows an iid normal N(0,σ
2
u), while vit follows a truncated normal N(µv, σ
 2
v), taking
only positive values and independent of uit.
Following Battese and Coelli (1995) methods of maximum-likelihood, the variance
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consequence, the efficiency of the i will be given by:
( ) [ ] i i i v E ET ε / exp − =26
Note that ETi takes values {0, 1}, where 1 represents optimal efficiency.  A more
flexible measure of efficiency is provided by panel data under:
[ ] ( ) ( ) T t v v i it − − = η exp .
where η is a parameter to be estimated and vi represent the positive values of the
truncated normal function. Hence, it becomes possible to estimate time-varying
parameters according to the position of  η.
Our translogarithmic cost-function can be computed as follows, using two products
(credit and investments) and three inputs (capital, labor and deposits), (where we
omit time and bank subscripts for simplification):
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We shall assume homogeneity of input prices, using physical capital as the scalar,
such that:
1






nm ∀ = ∑ 0 β           and           n
n
jn ∀ = ∑ 0 δ
Let’s assume as well symmetry conditions:
j i for kj jk ≠ =α α
j i for kj jk ≠ =α α
Hence, the cost-function to be estimated takes the form of:27
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where sub-script c represents credit, i investment, k capital, l labor and d deposits.
2. Data
Bank data corresponds to official reports to the Bank-Superintendence, where we
benefited from Asociación Bancaria data files (including number of employees).
Figures correspond to (real) Colombian million pesos of September 2005.
Data sample was restricted for 1991-1993, so that actual estimation includes Q1-
1994 through Q4-2005, for 30 banks, excluding: Estado, Bancoop, Interbanco,
Coopdesarrollo, Aliadas, UCN, Uconal, Of America, Standard Chartered Colombia
and Boston, because they did not perform as fully commercial banks. Dummy
variables were introduce to capture the effect of M&A.
3. Econometric Results
Chart 5 summarizes main finds. The parameter γ = 0.94 shows the explanatory
power of the inefficiency term (v) with respect to the error term variation (ε=v+u).
This result indicates that cost-inefficiency is the main source of variations with
respect to the optimal stochastic frontier.28
Knowing  that  efficiency  is  in  the  range  {0,1},  we  can  conclude  that average
efficiency for the Colombian banking system is 0.63. Asset-weighted efficiency is
0.59.  This implies that the banking system of Colombia could save up to 40% in
costs if the optimal production frontier could be reached.  We have already detail in
previous  chapters  the  regulatory  barriers  that  could  be  removed  to  help  the
banking system move towards that optimal production frontier.
Chart 5
Cost Function Model estimation results
Agregated Trend Trend Square
Coefficient t stad Coefficient t stad Coefficient t stad
?0 -1,59                             -1,44              -2,60              -2,51              -2,48              -2,45                          
?c -0,95                             -4,93              -0,38              -1,81              -0,44              -2,10                          
?i 1,89                              10,60             1,37               8,05               1,42               8,29                           
?l -0,10                             -0,34              -1,04              -3,72              -1,23              -4,31                          
?d 0,25                              1,08               0,90               4,18               0,90               4,17                           
?c,c 0,22                              9,02               0,17               6,63               0,18               6,82                           
?i,i -0,04                             -2,01              -0,01              -0,45              -0,02              -0,82                          
?c,i -0,10                             -5,22              -0,09              -4,54              -0,09              -4,51                          
? i,c -0,10                             -5,22              -0,09              -4,54              -0,09              -4,51                          
?l,l 0,06                              1,18               0,12               2,42               0,12               2,32                           
?d,d 0,02                              0,56               -0,02              -0,60              -0,00              -0,13                          
?l,d -0,01                             -0,39              -0,06              -1,70              -0,08              -2,38                          
?d,l -0,01                             -0,39              -0,06              -1,70              -0,08              -2,38                          
∂c,l -0,01                             -0,34              0,06               1,88               0,08               2,36                           
∂c,d 0,15                              6,02               0,05               2,22               0,06               2,63                           
∂i,l 0,05                              1,83               0,03               1,26               0,03               1,03                           
∂i,d -0,14                             -7,70              -0,09              -4,69              -0,10              -5,18                          
M&A dummy 0,16                              6,00               0,01               0,39               -0,01              -0,63                          
Models with technological 
trend
t 0,11               7,38               0,19               6,84                           
 1⁄2 t2 -0,00              -6,34                          
?2  0,08                              8,31               0,50               8,18               0,24               11,20                        
?
0,61                              15,51             0,94               107,30           0,89               64,89                        
Iterations 22,00                            34,00             41,00            
Log Likelihood 250,41                         101,35           106,21          
Average Efficency 0,63                              0,87               0,85              
Ponderated Efficency 0,59                              0,86               0,84              29
Graph 4 depicts the historical evolution of aggregate bank efficiency (which is not
directly comparable to the 0.63 value reported above).  Note the relative stability of
such variable during 1994-1998, before the eruption of the mortgage crisis. After
the crisis, the efficiency declines and only shows a slight recovery in early 2005,
but without attaining the pre-crisis level.
Graph 4

























































































































































This result is a novelty within post-crisis studies, since this is the first one to report
this late-recovery in efficiency of the banking system (see Chart 6 for a comparison
with other aggregate results). Micro-analysis at the level of the different banks
indicates that mortgage banks were the more stable before the 1998-crisis, but
they have been the more affected by the crisis.   In fact, mortgage loans only








Suescún y Misas  1989-1995 TFA Relative 73%
Crisis
Castro (2001) 1994-1999 DFA Relative 49%
Badel(2002)* 1998-2000 DFA Relative 73%
Janna(2003) 1992-2002 SFA Absolute  34%
Estrada y Osorio  1989-2003 SFA Absolute  28%
Recovery
Anif(2005) 1994-2005 SFA Absolute  63%
* The estimated cost frontier includes banks of Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico.
** Thick Frontier Analysis (TFA), Distribution Free Approach (DFA), Stochastic Frontier Analysis.
*** The Estrada and Osorio  paper studies few years of the recovery period, 
therefore their stimations are pricipaly biased by the crisis
M&A Effects
In order to capture the effect of M&A on banking efficiency, we have selected the
cases:  i)  Las  Villas-Ahorramás,  ii)  Bancafé-Concasa,  iii)  Colpatria  -  Red
Multibanca. iv) BIC - Bancolombia,
i) Las Villas – Ahorramás: Graph  5  shows  that the  M&A process  of these
institutions negatively affected its efficiency since it occurred during the crisis and
the economies of scale were possible to be exploited. Furthermore, since the
mortgage crisis has prevailed, recovery has been slow for these joint-institutions.
ii) Bancafé – Concasa. Graph 6 indicates a similar process for these public
institutions, badly hit by the mortgage crisis.  However, recovery has been more




















































































































































































































































iii) Banco Colpatria – CAV Colpatria – Red Multibanca Colpatria. Graph 7 shows
similar  results  to  other  mortgage  banks.   However,  this  joint-institution  was
particularly badly hit by the crisis.32
Graph 7


















































































iv) BIC – Bancolombia.  Graph 8 shows a notable recovery during pos-crisis, given
the fact that this is a non-mortgage institution.   In this case the exploitation of













































































































In order of brevity, we skip here reporting sensibility analysis, which showed robust
results when altering different scalars regarding the homogeneity assumption.  We
also assessed the effect of technological changes by introducing time and time-
square variables.  Main results were not altered in a significant manner.
IV. Conclusions
We  have  studied  the  renewed  interest  in  merging  and  acquiring  financial
institutions in Colombia during 2003-2005. These have been “complementary
mergers” that seek to exploit economies scale and scope. This process contrasts
favorably with those mergers & acquisitions that occurred during the mid-1990s,
which  involved  mainly  “twin  institutions”  that  lacked  potential  for  gaining
multiproduct efficiency.
In this document we have analyzed the need to remove some of the regulatory
constraints that obstruct further exploitation of such economies of scale-scope and
quantifies the “cost efficiencies” shown by the Colombian banking sector (1994-
2005). At the aggregate level, we found (absolute) banking efficiency to be around
63%, a similar value to those found in related studies post-crisis.  This implies that
banks operating in Colombia have been able to recover their efficiency levels
during post-crisis 2003-2005, except for mortgage institutions. We have highlighted
regulatory barriers that could be removed to help the banking system move closer
to the optimal production frontier.34
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